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Casenote
SECURITIES LAW-Securities Transaction Incident To
Corporate Fraud: The Wrenched Connection.
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
INTRODUCTION
The operative language of Section 10 (b)1 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-52 limits their application to fraud
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." The Su-
preme Court was given the opportunity to interpret the scope of that
phrase in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. 3
Standish T. Bourne and James F. Begole hit upon a scheme to
buy Manhattan Insurance Company with its own assets. The fraud-
ulent scheme was to involve three separate but related stages.
Begole would first write a 5,000,000 dollar check. This check would be
given to Bankers Life, the owner of all of Manhattan's outstanding
I Securities Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78 j (1970). Section 10 pro-
vides in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative, or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
Rule 10b-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
3 404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
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stock, in exchange for such stock. As the new sole stockholder, he
would persuade the board of directors to release 5,000,000 dollars
worth of treasury bonds from Manhattan's portfolio, promising to
replace them with certificates of deposit of equal value. Last, he
would cover his check with the proceeds from the sale of the trea-
sury bonds and get a 5,000,000 dollar loan to buy certificates of de-
posit which would be pledged as security for the loan.4 In January
of 1962 the plan was implemented for the benefit of all concerned
except the policyholders and creditors of Manhattan, who, it was
hoped, would never discover the scheme.
In April of 1963 during an annual audit, the scheme was dis-
covered by the New York Insurance Department which immediately
placed Manhattan in liquidation. 5 Subsequently, the Superintendent
of the New York Insurance Department 6 as liquidator of Manhattan
brought suit alleging violation of Section 17 (a) of the Securities
Act of 1933.7
A motion was made to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
there was a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,8
and that the plaintiff lacked the requisite standing to recover dam-
ages for alleged violations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that Manhattan
had standing in relation to the sale of its treasury bonds but granted
the motion to dismiss because it found that the fraud alleged was
not "in connection with the sale" of Manhattan's treasury bonds so
4 For a complete discussion of the intricate financial transactions em-
ployed to conceal the depletion of Manhattan's assets see 300 F. Supp.
1083, 1089-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
5 N.Y. INs. LAW § § 511, 513 (McKinney 1966). Among other things,
liquidation of a New York insurance company may be predicted on
the insurer's insolvency.
6 By operation of law, the superintendent is vested with the title to all
property, contracts and rights of action of the insurer as of the date
of the entry of the order of liquidation. N.Y. INs. LAw § 514(2)
(McKinney 1966).
7 Securities Act § 17 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). The complaint
originally alleged that Manhattan was the purchaser of its own stock
from Bankers Life, and as a purchaser it sought redress under § 17 (a)
of the 1933 Act. Through amendatory allegations presented in open
court, Manhattan was able to allege it was the seller of its treasury
bonds, and therefore entitled to relief under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5.
8 In Manhattan's suit the objections concerning jurisdiction over the
subject matter and failing to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted were one in the same because Manhattan was attempting
to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction by raising a federal
question under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5.
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as to make out a recognizable claim under Section 10 (b) and Rule
10b-5.9 After a divided Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, 10 the case came before the Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari for the Court's consideration of whether a cause of action
based on the sale by Manhattan of its treasury bonds had been
pleaded under Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court
held that the alleged fraud in the bond sale was cognizable under
Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 and, accordingly, reversed and re-
manded the case to the district court.
The purpose of this article is to point out: (1) the impact of the
Court's decision on the prior legislative and judicial development of
Rule 10b-5; and (2) the lack of guidance given by the rule and
the need for administrative clarification.
FEDERAL FRAUD: DEVELOPMENT OF 10b-5
Prior to the Securities Act of 1933 the only federal statute under
which securities fraud could be prosecuted was the mail fraud
statute." Presently, however, there are three general federal anti-
fraud provisions, Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section
15 (c) (1)12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Under these provisions's three possible types of relief are
available: injunctive or administrative action by the commission,
criminal prosecution for willful violation, and private actions by
buyers and sellers for recision or damages.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted in response
to the disastrous speculation of 1928 and 1929,14 and a Presidential
call for "securities legislation which has teeth in it."'15 Congress
originally proposed to deal with securities fraud under a catch-all
phrase known as Section 9 (c). Section 9 (c) read in effect, "Thou
shalt not devise any other cunning devices."' 6 However, in view
9 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
10 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970).
11 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
12 Securities Exchange Act § 15(c) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c) (1) (1970).
13 For a general discussion of the distinctions between the three sections
see 3 L. Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION 1423-30 (2d ed. 1961).
14 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934).
15 H.R. Rn. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
16 Hearings on H.R. 7852 and 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
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of the numerous objections interposed by the securities industry17
concerning the seemingly limitless power conferred by Section
9 (c), Congress enacted Section 10 (b) as it presently reads. Section
10 (b) was not a proscriptive statute as such but merely vested
broad discretionary rule-making powers in the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to prohibit any manipulative or deceptive de-
vice or contrivance "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
In 1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule
X-10b-5 to protect sellers, as well as purchasers, 8 of the securities
from fraudulent practices.19 Milton V. Freeman, one of the draftsmen
of the rule, described the origin of Rule X-10b-5 as follows:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office
in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and received a call from
Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and Ex-
change Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with
Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator
in Boston, "he has told me about the president of some company
in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company
from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling
them that the company is doing very badly, whereas in fact, the
earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for
this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came
upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10 (b)
and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only
discussion we had was where "in connection with the purchase or
sale" should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't
remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We
passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indi-
cating approval. Nobody said anything except Summer Pike who
said, 'Well," he said, "we are against fraud aren't we?" 2 0
Thus, a rule which began as an attempt to correct a blatant and
unsophisticated swindle must be now used to resolve the limits of
federal control of corporate misdeeds. As a consequence of this
reflexive action on the part of the S.E.C., the Congressional mandate
for clarity and guidance has been shifted to the federal judiciary.
17 Hearings on S. Res. 84, 56, and 91 Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 6624, 6634, 6899, 6910,
6936-38 (1933-34).
18 The four possible constructions of Rule 10b-5 in determining whether
Rule 10b-5 also applies to purchasers are discussed in Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961).
19 See SEC Sec. Ex. Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
20 Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAw 793, 922 (1967).
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The first case under Rule 10b-5 was Ward La France Truck
Corp.21 which was brought by the S.E.C. seeking injunctive relief
against two officers of Ward La France. The officers with inside in-
formation concerning a future merger were purchasing Ward La
France shares over-the-counter without proper disclosure. The Com-
mission concluded there had been a violation of the rule, and the
officers were directed to pay back the difference between the mar-
ket price and the price at which they had acquired the stock from
the defrauded stockholders. In 1946 Rule 10b-5 was interpreted in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.22 to allow a private cause of action
for a seller, and five years later the Second Circuit recognized a
similar right in purchasers. 23 Whether a private cause of action
exists under Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 has been a source of
controversy 24 ever since the Kardon case, but today, either by way
of direct holding, obiter, or sub silentio, ten of the eleven courts
of appeals25 have recognized a private cause of action.
The courts which recognized a private right of action had to
face the question of what wrongs would be corrected by this right
of action. The number of wrongs for which redress could be
sought under Rule 10b-5 was curtailed at an early stage in the
judicial development of Rule 10b-5 with the Second Circuit decision
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.2 6 The fraud in Birnbaum came
21 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
22 "In view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an
express civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law
implies." 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The court based its
holdings that a private right of action exists under § 10 (b) and Rule
10b-5 upon two grounds: (1) RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934); and
(2) Securities Exchange Act § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
23 E.g., Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
24 The Supreme Court has already held that a private right of action
exisits under the proxy provisions of the Act. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964). Although it has never expressly decided whether
a private right of action is similarly implied for violations of § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5, it has upheld complaints based upon that right without
discussion of the question. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363 (1966). But see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, supra note 20, at 922, wherein Freeman states that he
does not believe the draftsment of Rule lob-5 intended to confer a
private right of action. See A. BROMBERG, SEcURITiEs LAW: FRAUD-
SEC RULE lob-5 § 2.4(2) (1967).
25 For a listing of the cases in each circuit see 6 L. Loss, SEcumTIEs
REGULATiON 3871-83 (Supp. 1969).
26 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). The major significance of Birnbaum lies
not in its binding effect in terms of precedent, but from the fact that
it was decided in the Second Circuit, the center of a vast majority
of the security litigation.
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about when the president of Newport Steel rejected a favorable
merger for the stockholders of Newport in order that he might
receive a higher price for his stock. The complaint alleged violations
of fiduciary duties on the part of the president and directors, and
certain misrepresentations concerning the merger made to the stock-
holders. The court in examining the legislative history behind Sec-
tion 10 (b) concluded:
The section was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation of
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5 extended protection only to the de-
frauded purchaser or seller.27
The Second Circuit's decision in Birnbaum limited the redress avail-
able under Rule 10b-5 by imposing two judicial restrictions: (1) the
rule does not permit redress for breaches of fiduciary duty28 and
(2) an action under the rule is not available to a party who is
neither a purchaser nor a seller.29 The S.E.C.30 and numerous courts3 1
have expressed dissatisfaction with the inequity presented by the
standing restriction of being a purchaser or seller and have at-
tempted to circumvent the restriction by expanding the classes of
injured parties which are to be considered as purchasers or sellers.
The courts have dealt with the restriction concerning breaches of
fiduciary duties by expanding the comprehensiveness of the phrase
27 Id. at 464.
28 Accord, O'Neil v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Barnett v. Ana-
conda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 832-35(1956). But see Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Bahl-
man, Rule 10b-5: The Case For Its Full Acceptance As Federal Corpor-
ation Law, 37 U. CiNN. L. REV. 727, 761-69 (1968).
29 Although the purchaser-seller standing requirement has been modi-
fied in numerous ways, it is still the law in the Second Circuit in re-
gard to actions for damages. See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722
(2d Cir. 1972). Professor Loss gave his approval of the purchaser-
seller requirement as basically correct, 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITiEs REGU-
LATrON 1469 (2d ed. 1961), and has not changed his mind, 6 id. 3617
(Supp. 1969).
30 The Commission disagrees with the purchaser-seller standing require-
ment. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 7, Superintendent v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
31 See Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Kahan v.
Rosentiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1970); Ruckle v. Roto American
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960). See generally Ciechon, The
Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule l0b-5, 14 VILL.
L. REv. 499 (1969); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine:
A New Era For Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
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"in connection with the purchase or sale" to include a broader scope
of fraudulent activities.3 2
With this background, it is not surprising that today the status
of the law under Rule 10b-5 is one of confusion and internal con-
tradiction. On the one side there is the decision in Birnbaum which
has placed an extremely narrow construction on the rule. On the
other side, the S.E.C. has taken the position that the operative
language of Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," was included only to restrict its
powers over fraudulent activities to the securities field.33
To reach a decision in Superintendent of Insurance it was neces-
sary for the Supreme Court to enter into this chaos surrounding the
scope of Rule 10b-5.
THE MANHATTAN DECISION
The Court viewed the scheme to defraud Manhattan as one in-
volving misrepresentation, authorization of the sale, and misappro-
priation of the proceeds, and in effect held that, because the act or
practice "touched" the sale of Manhattan's treasury bonds, a claim
upon which relief could be granted under Rule 10b-5 was stated.
The opinion lends itself to analysis in two respects: (1) the broad
interpretation the Court gives Section 10 (b), and (2) the Court's
recognition that the 1934 Act was enacted to protect creditors as
well as stockholders.
To understand the significance of the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of the scope of Rule 10b-5, it is necessary to examine
the lower courts' fragmentation theory.34 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit and the District Court for the Southern District
of New York had viewed the scheme in a fragmented manner which
severely limited the scope of Rule 10b-5. The theory was based on
the belief that the purpose of the 1934 Act is limited to preserving
the integrity of the securities markets35 and to guarding against the
"sullying" of the purity of the security transaction.36 To accomplish
32 See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Gordon v.
Lipoff, 320 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Ciechron, The Decline of the
Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5, supra note 31, at 511-15.
33 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 17, supra note 30.
34 The Commission believed that the most serious deficiency in the court
of appeals' opinion was in its effort to fragment the transaction by
which Manhattan's treasury bonds were sold into several parts. Id.
at 22.
35 430 F.2d at 361.
36 Id.
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this purpose the lower courts thought it was necessary to isolate
each security transaction and then determine if there was any fraud
within that time frame. The court of appeals isolated the fradulent
scheme affecting Manhattan's treasury bonds into two parts: (1)
the exchange of Manhattan's treasury bonds for fair consideration,
and (2) the subsequent misappropriation of the proceeds from the
sale. In viewing the security transaction, the Court of Appeals found
this scheme to amount to nothing more than fraudulent misman-
agement of corporate affairs37 which is not actionable under Rule
10b-5.
The net effect of the propounded "fragmentation theory" was
to make the scope of Rule 10b-5 totally dependent upon a hair line
distinction: fraud in connection with a securities transaction being
actionable, and the effectuation of a securities transaction in con-
nection with a fraudulent activity not being actionable. This hair
line distinction was further elaborated on in Bailey v. Meister
Brau, Inc.8 wherein the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois announced a degree-relationship test to determine the scope
of Rule 10b-5. The court considered the rule emerging from Super-
intendent of Insurance to be:
There must be a determination of the degree to which the securi-
ties were involved in the alleged fraud, federal jurisdiction being
absent if the securities transaction was incidental to the fraud, or
as in the Manhattan case, designed to obscure the true nature of the
acquisition and means of financing it.39
The flaw in the Court of Appeals' treatment of the scope of Section
10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in Superintendent of Insurance stemmed from
its narrow view of the purpose of the 1934 Act. The purpose is not
limited to preserving the integrity of the securtities markets,40 but
as the Supreme Court concluded:
The Congress made clear that "disregard of trust relationships by
those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single
web" along with manipulation, investor's ignorance, and the like.
H.R. No. 1383, 73 Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6. Since practices "constantly
vary and where practices legitimate for some purposes may be
turned to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad discretionary
powers" in the regulatory agency "have been found practically
essential."4 1
87 Id. at 360.
38 320 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
39 Id. at 543.
40 404 U.S. at 12.
41 404 U.S. at 11-12 (citing note 15 supra, at 6, 7).
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To accomplish this congressional mandate, the Court announced
that flexibility and not restrictiveness 42 is the rule to be followed
in construing Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. The broad operative
language of Section 10 (b), "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, '43 lends strong support to the Court's interpre-
tation of Congress's intent. Clearly without a doubt this is the
"loosest linkage ' 44 between the proscribed act and a security trans-
action that can be found in any security law. By construing Section
10 (b) flexibly, not only fraud of a garden type variety,45 but also
novel and atypical methods of fraud will be circumscribed by the
federal securities laws.
The Court acknowledged that Congress by enacting Section
10 (b) did not seek to regulate transactions which comprise no
more than internal mismanagement,4 6 but the Court stated, "Since
there was a sale of a security and since fraud was used in connection
with it, there is redress under Section 10 (b), whatever might be
available as a remedy under state law."47 In other words, it is im-
material whether the purchase or sale was part of a larger scheme
of corporate mismanagement if the elements of a claim under Sec-
tion 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 are otherwise present.48
42 404 U.S. at 12. The Court had already determined that the 1934 Act
should be broadly construed in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967), wherein the Court stated: "In addition we are guided by the
familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities
Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category of remedial legis-
islation." Id. at 336. See also SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180
(1963).
43 This language should be compared with the much narrower language
"in the offer or sale" used in § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act. There appears
to be no legislative history behind the operative language of § 10 (b).
Brief for SEC as Amnicus Curiae at 10, Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909
(2d Cir. 1968).
44 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRiTiEs LAW; FRAuD--S.E.C. RULE 10-5 § 7.6 (1)
(1967).
45 See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
46 Congress failed to enact a federal incorporation statute in 1934. Pro-
fessor Loss reports: "The Roper Dickinson Report of early 1934, which
is part of the legislative history of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act ...
recommended federal incorporation as the most effective way to deal
with certain evils connected with market manipulation by directors,
and officers, the issuance of stock to insiders for inadequate consider-
ation, incomplete publicity of corporate accounts, and similar prob-
lems." 1 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 109-10 (2d ed. 1961).
47 404 U.S. at 12.
48 This position had been adopted earlier in Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d
872 (5th Cir. 1970).
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It appears from the Court's broad interpretation of the purpose
of the 1934 Act and its flexible construction of Section 10 (b) that
the scope of Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 has been extended to
cover fraud whenever it touches49 the security transaction. In ex-
amining the alleged fraud in the sale of Manhattan's treasury
bonds, it was therefore necessary for the Court to consider the
scheme in its entirety. Using this touch concept in regard to the
overall scheme, the Court found there certainly was an "act" or
"practice" within the meaning of Rule lOb-5 (3) which operated
as a fraud or deceit on Manhattan, the seller of government bonds.5 0
The essential difference between the Supreme Court's construction
of Rule 10b-5 and that of the lower courts was the time frame ex-
amined.51 The lower courts looked strictly at the time frame en-
compassing the security transaction, whereas the Supreme Court
examined all of the distinct time frames in an integrated manner.
Having concluded that Manhattan had stated a cause of action
under Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, it was necessary for the Court
to determine if Manhattan was injured as a result thereof. 2 At first
glance it would seem impossible for a closed corporation to have
been defrauded to its detriment when the sole stockholder was a
perpetrator of the fraud. However, on closer examination it be-
comes obvious that the victim was the corporate entity.53 And after
examining the legislative history behind the 1934 Act,54 the Court re-
49 404 U.S. at 12.
50 Id. at 9.
51 A. B. C.
Begole's purchase of S a 1 e of Manhat- The subsequent mis-
Manhattan's s t o c k tan's treasury bonds appropriation of the
from Bankers Life. for f a i r consider- proceeds f r o m the
ation. sale.
(1) Court of Appeals only examined time frame B.
(2) Supreme Court examined time frames A, B and C in an integrated
manner.
52 One ground for the district court's dismissal of Manhattan's complaint
was that the injury in this case was not incurred by anyone who was
the subject of federal concern. 300 F.Supp. at 1083 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
53 It has been established ever since Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), that an injured corporation
can bring an action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. In Hooper a trustee
in bankruptcy sought relief for Consolidated American Industries, and
the court stated, 'We decline as we think that Court would, to read
into its language a holding that a corporation injured by a sale or
purchase of securities has no private right of action under § 10 (b)
and X-10b-5." Id. at 203.
54 See note 15 supra, at 3, 4. Therein the House Committee recognized
the impact of securities fraud on the insurance policyholders. Today
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fused to disregard the corporate entity just because the creditors
of the corporation were the ultimate victims.5
As the Court pointed out, "The controlling stockholder owes the
corporation a fiduciary obligation- one 'designed for the protection
of the entire community of interests in the corporation- creditors
as well as stockholders.' "56 Begole's breach of his fiduciary duty to
Manhattan caused damage in three respects: (1) Manhattan's credi-
tors and policy-holders extended credit in one form or another
which they would not have done had they known the true state
of the corporation finances; (2) Manhattan was exposed to the risk
of liability for taxes and to persons extending credit in reliance on
misrepresentations flowing from the scheme to defraud; and (3)
Manhattan's assets were depleted by 5,000,000 dollars.
The Court summed up the notion of corporate disability by citing
Shell v. Hensley:57
When a person who is dealing with a corporation in a securities
transaction denies the corporation's directors access to material in-
formation known to him, the corporation is disabled from availing
itself of an informed judgment on the part of its board regarding
the merits of the transaction. In this situation the private right of
action recognized under Rule 10b-5 is available as a remedy for
the corporate disability.58
A claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 10b-5
having been found to exist by the Court,59 the case was reversed
and remanded to the District Court for the Southern District of
New York for a trial on the merits in regard to the alleged fraud
in the sale of Manhattan's treasury bonds.
CONCLUSION
The problem can be more readily understood through the use
of a poker game analogy. It is like a poker game carried on by three
participants, A, B and C. A and C buy 100 dollars worth of chips6"
there is even a greater impact with insurance companies continuously
increasing their investments in corporate stocks and government
bonds. See 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Institutional In-
vestor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 778-80,
847-63 (1971).
.55 404 U.S. at 12.
,56 404 U.S. at 12 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-307
(1939) ).
57 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
58 Id. at 827.
59 404 U.S. at 14.
60 For purposes of this poker game analogy the chips are analogous to
securities because only securities fraud is covered by Rule 10b-5.
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from B and then pursuant to their preconceived scheme, they pro-
ceed to cheat him. B finally detects the underhanded play on the part
of A and C and calls a sudden halt to the game. As the Court of
Appeals would have viewed the situation, if at the time B sold his
chips to A and C he had received fair consideration for the chips,
there would be no actionable fraud. However, the Supreme Court
would look not only at the original purchase of the chips but at the
entire game to determine if fraud were present.
The poker game analogy is extremely useful if the Supreme
Court's opinion is given a literal interpretation. It becomes apparent
now that the operative language of Rule lob-5 requires only that
the fraud touch61 the security transaction. Such an interpretation
would be in accord with the Court's broad reading of the 1934 Act
and its mandate that flexibility is to govern the construction of
Section 10 (b). However, a literal interpretation would be in direct
contravention of the cautious attitude the Court expressed in 1968
in S.E.C. v. National Securities:62
Although Section 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 may well be the most
litigated provisions in the federal securities laws, this is the first
time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them. We enter
this virgin territory cautiously. The questions presented are narrow
ones. They arise in an area where glib generalizations and unthink-
ing abstractions are major occupational hazards.63
But no matter whether the opinion is viewed broadly or nar-
rowly, it represents a futile attempt to clarify the law in the area
of Rule 10b-5. The concept, "touching the security transactions," is
inherently vague and ambiguous. The use of such a word as touch
is to speak in terms of a generality which has boundless construc-
tions. Therefore the net effect on the operative language of Rule
10b-5 is but to add another tier of confusion to an already unstable
foundation."
Criticism of the Court is not intended for it is nearly impossible
to cure a malignant disease when the tools and guidance for such
61 It is acknowledged that the Court only uses the word touch once in
reference to the crux of Manhattan's case, but this author feels the
signficance of the word touch lies in the numerous pqssible construc-
tions of the word by the eleven different circuits, for each circuit still
seeks the light in this area.
62 393 U.S. 453 (1968).
63 Id. at 465.
64 It could be a point of controversy whether or not the Court's use of the
word touch adds another wrinkle to judicial interpretations of Rule
lOb-5 or whether it is merely an elaboration on already existing
interpretations, but no matter, for irrefutable certainty is lacking.
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cure have not yet been provided. The solution to the state of chaos
surrounding Rule lOb-5 lies not with the courts, who must consider
the narrow issues before them without serious administrative con-
sideration of the broad problems, but with the creator of Rule
10b-5, the Securities and Exchange Commission. Congress delegated
certain authority to the S.E.C. as set out in Section 10 (b). In the
area of securities fraud the S.E.C. can proscribe such rules and
regulations as are necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors consistent with its congressional
grant of authority. S.E.C. dissatisfaction with the judicial treatment
of Rule 10b-5 has been expressed in numerous areas.65 But after
thirty years of internal confusion Rule 10b-5 still reads as it was
promulgated in 1942.
Such opinions as Superintendent of Insurance clearly indicate
the S.E.C. has neglected its duty to clarify the rule. Our judicial
system cannot administer justice in a coherent manner when it is
impossible to comprehend the rules by which the system is to be
governed.
Joe E. Armstrong '73
65 See notes 30, 24, and 33 supra.
